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Health and hospital services have been under pressure to
cut costs and increase efficiency in most European coun-
tries. This article analyses how organisational change in
health care now is moving in two ways: either towards
“internal markets” on the implicit presumption of widen-
ing choice for both providers and patients, or towards “in-
ternal flexibility” and efficiency gains based on explicitly
aiming at mutual advantage for both patients and health
service providers. It relates these paradigms to those which
they mirror in the production sphere, including “Fordist”
models of lowering costs in volume provision, and “post-
Fordist” models of flexible work practices focussed on
more customised quality provision of services. It suggests
on case study evidence from the UK that “internal mar-
kets” and more Fordist health provision have increased
patient throughput, but have not reduced costs or widened
patient choice, while in key cases reducing the quality of
patient service. It draws on other case studies of alternative
“post-Fordist” models of hospital organisation as an exam-
ple of how cost reduction can be achieved by focussing
directly on patient flow and thereby also increasing the
quality of patient care. It draws implications from these for
alternative paradigms of flexibility-by-constraint and flex-
ibility-by-consent in hospital and health provision, and re-
lates these to proposals for innovation-by-agreement, life-
long learning and a better work-life balance as
recommended by the Lisbon European Council in June
2000. Allowing for cultural differences, it submits also that
the efficiency gains in hospital provision justify assessing
whether a transition to flexible post Fordism on the basis
of mutual advantage for patients and providers is feasible
in Portugal, and draws attention to the degree to which
continuous improvement has been achieved in Portugal in
the production sphere.
Keywords: fordism taylorism; implicit logic operational
and organisational logic; innovation-by agreement; mutual
advantage.
Throughout Western Europe ageing populations and
new medical techniques and treatments are increas-
ing demand for hospital services at the same time as
governments are seeking to restrain the mounting
costs of health provision. Several are trying to exter-
nalise direct costs either by more out-sourcing, or
increasing health charges to patients, or public-pri-
vate partnerships, or a combination of all three. Some
are rethinking the “flexibility” issue in relation to
“internal markets” in health provision. Many are try-
ing to gain more patient throughput from a system
whose organisational and operational design is still
inflexible. Few are following through the recommen-
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dation of the Lisbon Agenda for a different flexibility
based on:
“agreements between social partners on innova-
tion and lifelong learning, by exploiting
complementarity between lifelong learning and
adaptability through flexible management of
working time and job rotation,... reducing occu-
pational segregation, and making it easier to rec-
oncile working life and family life”. (European
Council, Lisbon, 2000).
Implicit within these alternative approaches are dif-
ferent paradigms of health organisation, each of
which mirrors paradigms of work organisation in the
production sphere. This article seeks to make these
more explicit and to identify different actual and
potential outcomes both for patients and health care
providers.
It does so first by briefly outlining paradigms of
Fordist mass production and alternative post Fordist
models of flexible work operation. Second, it consid-
ers the degree to which these are relevant to the pro-
vision of health services and especially hospital or-
ganisation. Third, it considers the scope and limits of
Fordism in the case of reforms of the British National
Health Service and hospital organisation since the
1980’s. Fourth, it outlines alternative paths to flex-
ibility in health provision and hospital organisation in
the case of a leading Swedish hospital. Fifth, it re-
lates the concepts of changes in organisational and
operational logic to premises for consensual achieve-
ment of efficiency gains by health service providers
and health workers. Sixth, it suggests the conditions
for gaining a paradigm shift in hospital and health
organisation in line with the recommendations of the
Lisbon Agenda which can improve efficiency in
service to patients while enhancing both job fulfil-
ment and work-life balance for health employees. It
also addresses the cultural factor in institutional and
organisational learning and whether it need be a bar-
rier to international transfer of best practice, before
drawing summary conclusions.
1. Fordism and post Fordisms
“Fordism”, as it was identified before WW2 by
Antonio Gramsci (1975), concerned not only Henry
Ford’s mass production on a moving assembly line,
but also his realisation that “the American dream” of
a mass consumption society depended on highly paid
workers who could afford to buy what the new sys-
tem could produce (Ford, 1923). He combined this
with Frederick Taylor’s (1911) reduction of assem-
bly work to simple unskilled tasks, monitored by
time and motion studies against benchmarks of per-
formance and with supervisory surveillance of as-
sembly operations. Such Taylorist “scientific man-
agement” (Taylor, ibid), was consciously adopted by
Ford himself in his first integrated mass production
factory and became the standard paradigm for work
organisation in most high volume western companies
for most of the 20th century.
The outcome of Ford’s production revolution was
dramatic throughput gains combined with massive
cost reduction. Within a few years the company had
eliminated near three hundred individual craft pro-
ducers of autos in the US, and was supplying nearly
half the vehicles in the world (Lacey, 1987). But the
highly pressured and strictly monitored Taylorist la-
bour process also meant high levels of absenteeism
and major labour turnover despite high pay. Henry
Ford also was an authoritarian who refused to del-
egate, or vary his initial Model T, notoriously declar-
ing that customers could have it colour they liked so
long as it was black. He would not allow correction
of faults in assembly since stopping the moving line
for a few minutes could lose him a whole vehicle. He
initially refused to recognise trades unions. His reluc-
tance to modify or replace his early success, the
Model T, led increasingly to a loss of market share
from a peak of nearly two thirds to less than two
fifths (Lacey, ibid).
When half a dozen of Ford’s surviving competitors
regrouped themselves in General Motors, they hired
Charles Sloan as general manager. Sloan matched the
operational logic of Ford’s moving assembly line and
Taylorist high task segmentation with a new organi-
sational logic, structuring the company in divisions
with their own units, services and assembly lines,
specialised and delegated management roles, intro-
duced annual model changes, and accommodated
trades unions in a manner which stabilised labour
relations and reduced labour turnover. As in many
hospitals, there was no explicit agreement to “life-
time employment”, but the stability and market
dominance of General Motors, Chrysler and Ford,
commanding 95% of the US market for decades to
come, itself assured the presumption that working for
them was a “job for life”. Henry Ford II, replacing
his father, promptly adopted the principles of Sloan’s
multi-divisional management variant of “Fordism”.
But this, for all three of the auto majors, still stressed
volume throughput rather than quality. Fault rates
were high since only some vehicles were quality
checked after being assembled. None were custom-
ised to individual specification. Buyers could choose
from the colour combinations and other features pro-
ducers offered. Consumer choice was presumed to
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count for more than fuel efficiency or reliability, but
also limited to what the major producers were pre-
pared to offer (Lacey, 1987; Mintroff, 1988; Senge,
1990).
It was only from the 1980s’s that management in
Europe and the US became aware that leading Japa-
nese companies were achieving both fault-free pro-
duction and diversified output on the same assem-
bly line by a new “post Fordist” operational logic.
Unlike Taylorism and its top-down operational
logic, or Ford’s concern to maintain the speed of
throughput despite faults, (Lacey, 1987), Japanese
firms were emulating the Toyota production system
which allowed workers to stop the assembly line to
remedy faults at source, and which drew also on
their tacit knowledge, latent abilities and implicit
skills to gain suggestions for continuous improve-
ment or kaizen in methods of work operation, in-
cluding cutting out wasted time and materials. This
was with combined with kanban or “just-in-time”
delivery of components to the vehicle assembly
point by suppliers both to meet the day’s working
needs and also “make-to-order” (Womack et al.,
1990; Colenso, 2000).
This “post Fordist” production logic more than dou-
bled output per worker per decade in Toyota and
Honda by the 1970’s (Ohmae, 1982), reduced unit
costs, increased competitiveness, and also achieved
fault-free production (Colenso, 2000). Motivation for
workers was a combination of profit sharing equiva-
lent to a total of a quarter of income, and a commit-
ment by employers to lifetime employment to the age
of 55, with a then lump sum pension payment which
employees could use either for retirement at that age,
or invest in their own enterprise (Womack et al.,
1990). From producing 7,000 vehicles a year shortly
after WW2, as much as GM then produced in a day,
within 25 years Toyota became the world’s second
largest global producer and within 50, was set to
overtake GM itself as world no. 1 (The Economist,
2005a). Meanwhile, GM and the two other US auto
majors were competing between themselves not on
quality, but who would file first for bankruptcy (The
Economist, 2004).
2. Fordism and hospital work
and organisation
It is clear that Taylor’s (1911) single task segmenta-
tion is not relevant to key hospital workers, espe-
cially nurses and junior doctors, who both are multi-
tasked and need multiple skills. Nonetheless, hospital
work organisation shares some of the features of
Fordism in the production sphere. Although diagno-
sis and treatment of patients is individual, the aim is
the dedicated mass production of a health service.
This is needed if a service is to be available to the
public as a whole rather than only some individuals
or social groups. It is integral to social inclusion. It
also reflects increasing demand. For instance, in Por-
tugal the number of patients treated in hospitals in-
creased from 374,500 in 1970 to 823,000 in 1990,
while the number of patient consultations over the
same period increased from 1.5 million to 6.3 million
and urgency cases from 774,000 to nearly 6 million
(Barreto, 1996; Portugal. Departamento de Gestão
Financeira, 2002).
But, while there has been such a dramatic increase in
service provision, the organisational paradigm of
many hospitals remains the same as when provision
and patient turnover was at much lower levels. Cross
referral of patients for diagnosis in different
specialisations and services tends to lengthen waiting
lists and slow patient flow, especially with appoint-
ments with different services on different dates, or
simply “lost files” through no coordinated informa-
tion system. Patients are people not products, but
there is a strong case for considering their diagnosis
and treatment as “work in progress” through “patient
path planning”, focussing on how wasted time in
such assessment and treatment can be reduced,
(Kaplinsky, 1995 and direct enquiry).
2.1. Under-utilisation of capacity
Further, the organisation of most hospitals reflects
the vertical multi-divisional model adopted by Gen-
eral Motors in the 1920’s, and typical of large private
sector organisations before many of them more re-
cently sought to gain more “horizontal” structures
(Womack & Jones, 2005). Just as large companies
are organised in production, finance, marketing and
other divisions, so hospitals are organised in different
departments, services and units. Each specialisation
tends to have its own operating theatre, its own diag-
nostic unit, its own wards and its own nursing and
surgical staff. This tends to replicate much of the
inflexibility of a Fordist organisational paradigm. In
particular, capacity utilisation between departments
and their operating theatres and wards will tend to
vary, and may vary widely. An early 1990’s study of
it in the Karolinksa hospital in Stockholm found dif-
ferences between departments and units ranging from
57% to 97%, with an average use of less than four-
fifths (Kaplinsky, 1995). This was not simply a func-
tion of waiting lists, which were long in most cases,
but under-utilisation of operating theatres, wards,
equipment and of available staff time.
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In Portugal, average capacity use in hospitals rose
from 68.7% in 1970 to 75.5% in 1998. This was
close to the European average (OECD, 2002, cit
Simões, 2004), yet was an increase of less than 7%
over 28 years in which demand vastly increased. It
was 5% below the capacity use of Karolinska when
it decided to go for major change in its organisational
paradigm. Less than full capacity use is not “wrong-
in-itself”. A department, operating theatre and ward
which is not fully utilised should have shorter wait-
ing lists than one which is so. But this may not be the
case. Lack of integration in diagnosis and patient
flow may be the cause.
2.2. Skill specialisation and career prospects
Higher levels of medical staff in hospitals tend to
have higher degrees of specialisation. Many diagnos-
tic and surgical skills are not general. Paediatrics and
gerontology, neurology and cardiology are different.
Their senior personnel need to be near the frontier of
knowledge and best practice in their area. But
Simões (2004) has reported a lack of both doctors
and nurses in several specialisations in Portuguese
hospitals and a difficulty in reconciling the demands
of different services because of this. Anaesthetics,
with special skills but general relevance for opera-
tions, can be a classic case of this (Kaplinsky, 1995).
Lack of lateral mobility also may mean that the gen-
eral skills of junior doctors and nurses are not avail-
able in highly pressured units or services because the
“tacit rules and implicit norms” of custom and prac-
tice (Oliveira, 2002) mean that no one has considered
that they might be redeployed there. Inversely,
though for the same reasons, no consideration has
been given to the feasibility of nursing staff in high
pressured services or units being able to reduce stress
and avoid “burn out” by moving for extended peri-
ods of time to those which are less pressured. Or, in
Donald Schön’s (1991) terms, there has been no joint
“reflective practice”.
Skill paths for junior doctors tend to be chosen by
them on a range of explicit or implicit criteria. They
cannot afford to neglect probable future demand and
supply of such skills. Some may opt for geriatrics
rather than paediatrics precisely because the work,
although less readily rewarding, is relatively under-
supplied. But if junior doctors start low they nonethe-
less know that whichever specialisation they choose
will have an articulated career path. They are aware
that after a certain number of years they will be can-
didates for promotion from junior to middle medics,
and then consultants. The path is long, and the early
steps may be highly demanding in terms of working
anti-social hours, such on night duty with consultants
only on call, but ultimately rewarding in terms of
personal fulfilment, status and pay.
2.3. Skills and tacit knowledge
Skill and career grades for other medical staff also
may be clear, but with fewer promotion prospects
and less vertical mobility. Nurses may move from
probationary to assistant, to principal and then senior
grades, depending on the hierarchy within the sys-
tem. They may be able to specialise, as with the cat-
egory of “specialised nurse” in Portugal, or become
a “head nurse” or “nursing supervisor”. But the top
two levels by definition are restricted to a few nurses
only. Skill shortages either may be evident or con-
cealed. Skills extension through systematic formal
retraining may be rare, and there may be no recogni-
tion of general nursing skills acquired informally
from years of experience. Ancillary staff, whether in
maintenance, security, catering or cleaning, tend to
have no path to skill enhancement or higher work
fulfilment, nor any “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) on
what may be going wrong in hygiene standards, es-
pecially if their work is contracted out. Failure to
integrate what they tacitly know in learning-from-
work may prove damaging to the integrity of hygiene
for a hospital as a whole, as illustrated later.
An EU funded four country project to identify skill
acquisition which was an outcome of the Lisbon
Agenda commitment to lifelong learning (Oliveira &
Holland, 2006) found that individual attribution of
skills to non-formal learning-from-work averaged
two thirds more than skills gained from formal edu-
cation or training; i.e. people credited their own skill
acquisition much more to experience of “learning on
the job” and “learning from life” than to formal in-
struction. This is especially likely to be the case at
lower levels of hospital employment where nursing
staff need to gain multiple skills from experience to
perform at minimally acceptable levels of efficiency,
and when many such skills are closer to what nor-
mally would be deemed to be professional rather
than only vocational standards. But such “on the job”
skill acquisition is not formally credited and nurses’
informal skill trajectories acquired from tacit experi-
ence tend to be under-recognised when there is no
articulated career structure for them. The lack of rec-
ognition of skills gained from experience and there-
fore of individual “implicit learning” (Reber, 1993),
plus the lack of job variation or any horizontal mo-
bility between departments, units or services tends
both to decrease commitment and constrain actual
skill deployment.
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2.4. Lack of dialogue
Many hospital staff, especially nurses and junior doc-
tors, work hours which exceed even formal limits to
overtime with “blind eyes” turned to this because
otherwise what needs to be done would not be done
within the current tacit rules and implicit norms of
work organisation. Such staff may do their best, but
there are limits to how well they can do so for long
hours without reducing the quality of service. The
work they do is highly flexible, but when they “need
a break”, either short term or longer term, inflexible
organisation may inhibit it. Staff needing to balance
work time and the responsibilities or personal needs
of non-work time may not be able to “voice”
(Hirschman, 1970) this need and, not being able to
do so, quit when the two become irreconcilable. This
will especially be the case if there is no structure for
dialogue between lower and at top levels, such as the
lack of trades union representation or nursing repre-
sentatives on the management board of a hospital, or
the management committee of a department (Simões,
2004). The outcome can reinforce what Morrison &
Milliken (2003) have recognised as institutional “si-
lence”. People may know at varying levels of con-
sciousness what could be done, but see no point in
proposing it. And this in turn understates efficiency
gains since as Thompson, Warhurst, and Callaghan
(2001) have found in other operational contexts, it is
employees themselves who often know best how to
make the connection between knowledge, skills and
effective services from non-formal on-the-job learn-
ing.
A large organisation needs explicit rules and proce-
dures to function. Procedural justice in health serv-
ices also is vital. Patients need to know, and feel, that
they have been fairly treated and not neglected. Most
general practices and hospitals try hard to ensure this.
But most hospital management would admit that
gaining a balance between management procedures
and both employee and patient needs is difficult to
achieve. As Bolton (2004) stresses, resentment grows
if health employees are judged only by performance
indicators which neglect their professional dedication
to their craft and fail to recognise the degree to which
this is based on skills, experience and commitment.
Benchmarking of performance can be vital for effi-
ciency, but either may be top-down, Taylorist and
implicitly authoritarian, or devolved, cooperative and
self-directed (Riesman, 1954) at group, unit or serv-
ice level within a context of commitment to continu-
ous improvement (Wolfram Cox et al., 1997).
Yet such devolved and self-direct commitment to
continuous improvement will be unlikely unless hos-
pital staff see it is to the mutual advantage of both
patients and themselves, rather than only an intensi-
fication of the work process. If over-worked, as com-
monly the case for much or most staff in many hos-
pitals, the response of “it’s not my job”, or
absenteeism, may not be small minded. It may be a
defence mechanism against exhaustion. It also may
reflect tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1958, 1962) that the
tasks concerned should be redesigned to assure more
effective availability of staff in relation to predictable
pressures during a day or night working cycle. It may
imply that pressure should be directly or indirectly
addressed in other ways, such as that the hospital and
its various units should be able to allow more flex-
ibility in the incidence of working time in relation to
personal life cycle needs, and allow more horizontal
mobility for, especially, nursing staff, between more
and less pressured departments or units. Because of
role and task segmentation, under-recognition of in-
formal skills, and cumulative pressures from inflex-
ible organisation, the hospital may not be able to
achieve otherwise feasible efficiency gains. It also
thereby will not be a “learning organisation” (Argyris
& Schön, 1974, 1996).
2.5. Work-life balance and career planning
Nursing staff therefore may be committed to nursing
as a profession, but with lower prospects than doctors
of promotion and professional recognition, less
chance for skills extension, or job variation, and little
to no chance to “voice” what they need or what in
their view should be changed in their own or pa-
tients’ interest. The outcome may be that they there-
fore have a lower degree of psychological commit-
ment to the hospital as an organisation than higher
level medical staff. Most hospital managers, head
nurses and nursing supervisors will recognise the
need for nurses to gain time off when subject to fam-
ily or other personal pressures. But despite a plethora
of government commitments to the principle of
work-life balance since the Lisbon Agenda (c.f.
Hildebrandt & Littig, 2006) few hospitals appear to
have followed through its recommendation that so-
cial partners should initiate procedures to ensure bet-
ter work-life balance.
The principle of the right to such a balance recog-
nises that commitment to work changes with differ-
ent phases of people’s own life cycles, such as from
being single and willing enough to work overtime to
fund a particular life style, to becoming a parent and
focussing on the needs of children, or needing to
provide psychological support for an elderly or be-
reaved parent. “Mid-life crisis” is a cliché, but also a
reality when a marriage or other relationship may be
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under strain, or adolescent children “join the wrong
crowd” because of lack of parental time for earlier
care of them rather than patient care. For a combina-
tion of such reasons, absenteeism among lower level
nursing staff not only may be higher than for medics,
but may seriously compromise the operational effi-
ciency of a hospital. High labour turnover also relates
to the lack of the right to work-life planning, espe-
cially with women leaving full-time nursing when
they have their own children and not returning, or
only returning to part-time, and on a contract basis.
UK evidence indicates that this tends to be related to
the implicit down-grading of part-time work and a
resulting gender imbalance in vertical mobility. Al-
though nursing is overwhelmingly a profession
dominated by women, they have the least chance of
promotion within it, and take much longer to gain it.
Thus Davies and Rosser (1986) found that promotion
for women to Nurse Officer in the NHS on average
took more than twice as long as for men (17.9 years
compared with 8.4), while Wyatt and Langridge
(1996) later found that although time until promotion
had been lowered, women still had to wait much
longer than men (11.4 years compared with 6.9). In
a case study of three Welsh NHS hospitals, Lane
(2000) found that promotion depended on full time
working, no flexible working time, and continuous
employment with no career breaks. As she says:
“Organizational policies and procedures did not
actively or explicitly favour men, but they did
reflect a male career model… women who choose
to work part-time due to childcare constraints find
that they cannot access the higher grades” (Lane,
ibid, p. 708).
Commenting that: “In a ‘lean’ world, no organization
can afford to neglect policies which will maximise
the utilization of available human resources”, she
identified “a clear need for diagnosing potential pat-
terns of disadvantage which may be relatively cov-
ert” and “managers” need to evaluate the adequacy
of not simply equal opportunities policies, but the
broader issue of long-term career planning” (Lane,
ibid, p. 705).
3. The British NHS reforms
Responses to increased demand for hospital services,
and lower unit costs, recently have gone two ways.
One is towards new methods of work organisation
addressing some of the issues just raised. The other,
in the United Kingdom, has moved towards a “new
Taylorism” (Burchill & Casey, 1996) with more spe-
cialisation of health management, and increased time
and motion studies and more intense benchmarking
and surveillance of employees’ performance. In the
UK this began with the incoming Thatcher govern-
ment and its presumption that a flexible private sec-
tor always was more efficient than inflexible public
sector “bureaucracies”, which then was echoed by
New Labour (Pollock, 2004). Its explicit logic was
the introduction of an “internal market” within the
health service, measuring, pricing and, where feasi-
ble selling health services by out-contracting much of
what hitherto had been internal to hospital or health
centre provision. It also was claimed that this would
raise the quality of health service by enlarging choice
of private enterprise provision (UK. Department of
Health and Social Security, 1983; UK. Department of
Health, 2004). Its implicit logic was that by making
first “trust” and then “foundation” hospitals responsi-
ble for their own finance would encourage effi-
ciency, while in the later case of foundation hospi-
tals, their being able to fund how and what they
wished without approval from the Secretary of State
for Health should attract more private capital and,
according to Pollock, Professor of Health Policy at
University College London, also showed the determi-
nation of New Labour to prove itself credentials as a
“pro-business” party (Pollock, op. cit).
3.1. “Change Management”
In itself, the case for more “professional” new public
management within the NHS was not without its own
justification. In many of the former NHS “directly
managed hospitals” there was limited financial con-
trol. In some cases, consultants and other staff could
be hired without even reporting to the management
board (Mueller et al., 2003). The explicit justification
of this was clinical needs. But these were within an
implicit logic which assumed that methods of work
organisation could not be re-thought or changed to
improve either patient flow or enhance job fulfilment
for different categories of medical staff. For instance,
consultants were being hired not only to train junior
doctors, but also nurses. While this could be justified
in cases of introducing an entirely new medical tech-
nique such as non-invasive heart transplants
(Edmonson, 2003), it was much less so for routine
training. Also, NHS management boards in many
cases had little to no information on the timing of
increased demand for individual services in terms of
referral, patient flow, average time spent in diagno-
sis, or other features of what actually was happening
within different departments and services. Clinical
standards could be high or excellent, but whether
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there either was economic efficiency in terms of re-
source use, or social efficiency for patients in terms
of reducing waiting times for treatment, was less
evident (Mueller et al., 2003).
On what initially appeared the constructive side of
the “change management” reforms, general practi-
tioners or GPs for the first time since the foundation
of the NHS were given the right to influence the
provision of hospital services. The Community Care
Act of 1990 offered a new voluntary scheme of GP
“fundholding” by which local doctors in larger group
practices could gain more funds with more responsi-
bility for their use, including the right to purchase
hospital treatment or community care for patients,
thereby introducing an internal market of “purchas-
ers” and “providers”, rather than a capitation princi-
ple based on a flat rate for every patient. The hitherto
powerful British Medical Association opposed this
on the basis that it would tend to privilege bigger
practices and also reinforce the imbalance of provi-
sion in favour of the South East of England, but was
overruled. Over half the general practices in the UK
signed up to the new “fundholding” scheme (Pollock,
2004). The implicit logic was Fordist on the basis
that larger more efficient practices would provide
models of greater efficiency which others then could
emulate, rather than the “craft” provision of services
by doctors working from one room surgeries or even
from their own homes. But the surveillance of the
new and quickly common fundholding was both ex-
ternal and internal. Since there was increased money,
but within “no excess” limits, the implicit logic of the
new principle was that doctors within general prac-
tices took to monitoring their own time and motion
practice on a Taylorist basis, such as that the time for
consulting patients should average not more than
seven minutes (Pollock, 2004).
The Conservative government reforms devolving
budgets to hospitals initially resulted in more effec-
tive management in many general hospitals. A new
Clinical Governance principle resulted in Boards
being set up including high level managers consider-
ing all the information that was routinely being col-
lected about performance, such as readmission rates,
deaths, non accidental injuries, drug errors, com-
plaints, health and safety accident reports, etc. These
boards now had enough authority to effect “change
management” in systems and services. But for more
than ten years the Conservative governments took
money out of the NHS under the pretext of “cost-
improvements”. Since the start of the Blair adminis-
tration in 1997 more money was undoubtedly in-
vested, but a rhetoric of “devolved power” in fact
increased bureaucracy at what was the former NHS
Health District level, while ensuring that control was
in reality more heavily exercised from the centre, on
a divide and rule principle between those opting for
“fundholding” and those who did not. Another re-
lated problem was that “change overload” created an
environment of “change on change” which meant
that there rarely was time for a policy to be com-
pleted and the effects evaluated before the govern-
ment decided to try something else and while talking
of “devolving power” imposed this top down and
monitored it from the centre (Mueller et al., 2003).
3.2. New Taylorism in the NHS “Reforms”
The combination of more centralised control with a
rhetoric of “devolving power” meant a single-loop
return (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1996) to one of the
main principles of Fordism — reintroducing
Taylorist time and motion studies and performance
benchmarking (Burchill and Casey, 1996). Focus
was on process and outcomes, with mission state-
ments, target setting, practice protocols, performance
appraisals, vacancy reviews, quality audits, and
“clinical nurse managers” similar to the line supervi-
sors in Fordist production. “Practice protocols” gave
step-by-step details of how nursing should be per-
formed as if nurses had not come to appreciate both
this and the ethos of nursing in training. To be told
by managers who might have no former experience
of the health service how it should be delivered in
Taylorist detail was an invitation to resent or ignore
strict observance of such performance criteria (Bol-
ton, 2004).
With investment also of more resources, the outcome
of both the Conservative and New Labour changes
was an increase in patient admissions and patient-
staff ratios. In a longitudinal study of a gynaecology
unit in a northern hospital, Bolton (ibid.) found that
patient admissions rose by nearly half from 1993-4 to
1997-8 and that the patient to staff ratio rose from
less than 3 to 1 to nearly 8 to 1 over the same period,
although both admissions and patient-staff ratios fell
after this dash for growth or what Cousins (1987) had
earlier called the “factory-like logic” of the “new”
National Health Service. The outcome by 2004 also
had been a reduction in waiting lists. Therefore, the
new Taylorism did achieve more patient throughput
and thus higher productivity. But the ongoing pursuit
by government of higher Fordist volume throughput
on the presumption of economies of scale, rather than
of scope, also posed “size” problems. As an outcome,
some chief executives chose to take early retirement
rather than manage trusts that the government de-
cided should be vastly enlarged since in their view
they then would have been too big to be able to know
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what was going on, far less continue with “change
management by consent”.
There also has been serious challenge to key figures
published by the government. For instance, one of
the highest profile Taylorist benchmarking projects
of the New Labour NHS has been that no patient
should spend more than four hours in a hospital
Accident and Emergency or A&E departments. Gov-
ernment figures claim that by mid 2004 the target
was being met for 96% of patients. But according to
a survey of 55,000 patients by the independent
Healthcare Commission, only 77% of patients said
that they stayed no more than four hours in A&E. A
survey by the British medical Association of A&E
departments found that only 26% thought that the
figures claimed by the government were a true re-
flection of performance. Within the same target area,
a 2003 report by the Public Administration Commit-
tee of the House of Commons cited evidence where
A&E maximum waiting times “were being circum-
vented by imaginative fixes”. As The Economist
(2005b) commented: “The worry is that the official
figures start to reflect a parallel world created by
administrators striving to hit the target”.
3.3. New bureaucracy and surveillance
The outcome has not clearly been more “customis-
ing” care to patients’ needs than focus on timed
throughput of patients, just as Taylor (1911) timed
work operation to raise throughput in production. It
also involved a new “surveillance” bureaucracy. In
2000, a Commission for Health Improvement was set
up to undertake clinical governance reviews across
all hospitals in the NHS which within two years had
300 full time central staff and 500 staff in part-time
teams to carry out the reviews. A National Institute
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) also was set up with
the in itself worthwhile explicit aim of limiting the
growth of the NHS drugs bill by submitting the sales-
focussed clinical claims of drug companies to inde-
pendent scrutiny. But the Fordist standardisation of
lower cost drug provision to which NICE aspired
could not take account of different specialities and
scales of operation in different hospitals, while its
review teams were not sufficiently qualified in phar-
macology to carry weight either against the pharma-
ceutical lobby, which managed to reverse even its
first recommendation (Pollock, 2004). Meanwhile
surveillance added to rather than reduced bureauc-
racy. Frank Dobson, the Labour former Health secre-
tary, who earlier had tried to avoid much of this
(Pollock, ibid), claimed in the tenth year of New
Labour government that: “The so-called NHS re-
forms are costing a fortune. The government is
spending hundreds of millions of pounds on manage-
ment consultants and franchising operations to the
private sector. Money is being squandered on the
new payment system. Paperwork used to cost 4% of
the NHS budget, but now costs 15-16%” (Carvel &
Woodward, 2006).
Much of the resistance to the new Taylorist surveil-
lance in British hospitals has been vocal, through the
Royal College of Nursing but, lacking agency for
“voice” through dialogue (Hirschman, 1970), inef-
fective. Case studies confirming this at hospital level
(e.g. Bolton, 2004) indicate that nursing staff re-
sented the fact that while the new “consumers” of
health service have been given a formal voice,
through complaint procedures, they as health provid-
ers were not. Although a senior nursing officer under
the New Labour reforms was a member of the new
“management board”, this voice was too far removed
from the “shop floor” of operating theatres and
wards. Nurses in particular resented the implication
that they were “doing a job” for two employers, the
customer and the manager, rather than being able to
demonstrate commitment to giving a service. As
Bolton (ibid., p. 330) comments:
“Nurses have patients’ welfare at heart and are
generally supportive of management schemes that
are seen to benefit patients. However, while wel-
coming moves towards empowering patients, the
notion of aggressive consumerism remains an al-
ien concept. Nurses have taken on the guise of
entrepreneurs, but in order to further their own
definition of quality care. Nurses feel that they do
not need to become customer focussed as they are
already patient focussed, and they remain at-
tached to a public service ethos”.
3.4. External illogic
The new Taylorist focus on internal hospital effi-
ciency in the NHS also has neglected the costs of
resulting external diseconomies. Part of the gain in
patient admissions was due to patients spending less
time in hospital and thus an externalisation of post
operative care from hospital staff to general practi-
tioners or health workers, as well as families, whose
members could have to take time off work to care for
those concerned during recuperation. Faster through-
put also has meant a higher rate of re-admissions of
patients who formerly would have stayed longer in
hospital. Perversely also, although suiting managers’
claims on admissions, the total admission figures
include those who have had to be readmitted because
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of complications or failure to recuperate, with a “re-
volving door” effect that sending patients home early
raised “success” in later re-admission rates (Stern,
2006).
The introduction of new hospital managers and a
change in the composition of governing bodies also
meant a loss of “externalities” of interrelated local
knowledge and experience of the causes of health
problems. For instance, it is commonplace for local
politicians to receive letters from a local doctor
stressing that there was nothing that he or she could
do to remedy a patient’s chest condition until the
damp problem in his or her local authority housing
had been remedied. With community representatives
including local councillors on or chairing the govern-
ing bodies of hospitals and local and regional health
authorities until the early 1980s, such problems could
be addressed in an integrated manner. But this is less
the case when the managers now are from the com-
mercial sector rather than the local community. The
readmission of the individuals with the chest com-
plaint therefore will increase the performance bench-
mark of admission rates, while doing nothing to re-
solve the underlying problem causing their ill health.
3.5. Counter productive out-sourcing
The focus on Taylorist time, motion and cost reduc-
tion also has resulted in a deterioration of health in
UK hospitals. Infections have always been acquired
in hospitals, whatever the rigour with which nursing
or other employees seek to avoid them. But in NHS
hospitals they have increased significantly since out-
contracting of cleaning and its subjection to Taylorist
criteria. Many contractors concerned limited the dis-
infectant which ward cleaners could use, and in-
creased the wards they had to clean in a given time,
meaning that they could not change the water or add
cleaning fluid over allotted cost, time and motion
limits. Cleaners were swabbing different wards with
the same bucket of increasingly dirty and infected
water. The result was an infection crisis in hospitals
from the summer of 2003 caused by lack of hygiene,
including MRSA (Revill, 2005).
The new hospital management boards that could see
the problem coming could do little about it since out-
sourcing had been adopted as a national policy by the
government. Further, in its initial response to the
hygiene crisis, rather than rethinking the basis of its
cost reduction and out-sourcing strategy, and restore
control of both hygiene and health to nursing staff,
the government mirrored the Sloan version of
Fordism by appointing new national, regional and
local hospital “hygiene managers”, quickly dubbed
“health commissars” by the national press. Several of
these claimed that their inspectors could not find
evidence for the attribution of increased infection to
out-sourcing. The government also recognised an
increase in MRSA related deaths only in those cases
where they had been directly attributed by coroners.
Yet, even on this basis, they have increased from less
than 390 in 1997 to an ascribed near thousand in
2004. More generally, the government’s National
Audit Office recognises that as many as 5.000 per-
sons may have died of hospital acquired infections in
2004 alone (Revill, ibid).
Polly Toynbee, a deputy editor of The Guardian
newspaper, recognises that: “It is phenomenally
faster to get into hospital under Labour — but one in
11 will catch something nasty when they get there”
(Toynbee, 2005). Countering Tony Blair’s comment
that the problem was that “there are good cleaners
and bad cleaners”, Toynbee responded that the prob-
lem in fact was: “squeezed cleaning budgets with
contracted-out minimum wage cleaners using wa-
tered-down detergents, aged mops, no training, no
equipment, one cleaner to five wards and 30% vacan-
cies in London” (Toynbee, ibid.). She also found that
one reason the government claimed that its inspectors
could not agree with the diagnosis of the problem is
that they give notice of inspections in advance to
hospitals, “with managers bringing in all the night
and weekend cleaners to thoroughly clean the areas
to be inspected”. Overall, Toynbee commented:
“This is a New Labour parable... the excellent new
NHS pay system that rewards acquiring skills with
extra pay, doesn’t apply to contracted-out cleaners,
porters and security guards (who) should “now be
brought into the mainstream NHS team” (Toynbee,
ibid).
3.6. Financial and clinical costs of sub-contracting
A further New NHS parable comes from the con-
tracting out of cataract operations. In 2003, the New
Labour government listed new “diagnosis and treat-
ment centres” or DTCs. These were mobile clinics
which the health minister John Reid claimed at the
time would provide cheaper services than the NHS,
cut waiting lists and offer patients a choice of where
and when they have their operations. The Oxford
Eye hospital was at first bemused and then affronted
by this, and wrote in protest to its member of parlia-
ment. In May 2002, the health department had ex-
plained that the clinics would ensure that “no cataract
patient is waiting more than three months by Decem-
ber 2004”. But this was precisely the target the Ox-
ford Eye hospital already was meeting. Almost all
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the cataract patients then handled by the hospital
were to be referred to the DTC. The exceptions were
to be complex rather than routine cases. The routine
cases were to be treated in a mobile DTC clinic
which would visit their area, according to an internal
departmental memo, on only one day in every 10 or
11 weeks. To “save money”, the memo indicated that
the clinics might operate “on both eyes at once”.
NHS surgeons operate on only one eye at a time, in
case an infection leaves a patient completely blind
(Monbiot, 2003).
Most of the cataract operations at the time conducted
by the Oxford Eye Hospital therefore were trans-
ferred to the foreign company running the new diag-
nostic and treatment centre. But while it cost the eye
hospital £685 to perform each cataract operation, the
internal departmental memo revealed that the private
company was being offered £799.6 One of the rea-
sons why the private surgery was more expensive is
that surgeons needed to be flown in to perform it, and
would be paid between £450,000 and £500,000 a
year. Consultants employed by the NHS were paid
£60,000 a year. There also were negative implica-
tions for hospital training. The Oxford Eye hospital
had used routine cases to introduce apprentice sur-
geons to cataract techniques before bringing them
onto cases which were more complex. But the rou-
tine cases now were to be out-sourced (Monbiot,
ibid).
Such sub-contracting, therefore, did not fulfil the
government objective of reducing unit costs by de-
volving responsibility for budget limits. By the
spring of 2006, the National Heath Service hospital
trusts were faced with a financial crisis. Within two
weeks in March 4,000 jobs were cut nation wide,
with estimates of a further 10,000 further job losses,
or more, being voiced in parliament (Carvel &
Woodward, 2006). The Royal College of Nursing
said a preliminary analysis suggested nurses on the
basic grades were bearing the brunt of cuts, with
work transferred to lower-paid healthcare assistants.
Trusts were trying to recruit senior nurses to take on
some tasks previously performed by doctors (Carvel
& Woodward, ibid.) but in a tactical reactive context
of trying to reduce costs rather than a proactive strat-
egy to enhance senior nurses to career planning.
4. Alternative paradigms in practice
There are alternatives to the New Taylorism in health
provision which could achieve efficiency gains with-
out such direct or indirect costs. For example, in the
early 1990’s, rising healthcare costs prompted a Con-
servative government in Sweden to reduce central
government support for local healthcare. In Stock-
holm, the city council cut funding for hospitals
across the board and allowed residents greater choice
in selecting a hospital. But, rather than implementing
a downsizing programme, Jan Lindsten, Executive
Director of the Karolinska teaching hospital, with
4,000 employees, commissioned a study of patient
flow both into and through the hospital. The results
showed that average waiting time for surgery was
eight months. Surgeons spent as much as two thirds
of their time between operations, much of it waiting
rather than in pre or post operative evaluation. Oper-
ating theatres and wards for several specialisations
were under-utilised. Others were over pressured.
4.1. Quality of service, morale and efficiency
Lindsten’s initiative had three objectives: to improve
the quality of service to patients; to improve employee
morale, and enhance operational efficiency. The diag-
nostic phase of the programme started with surgery.
This showed that 59 per cent of potential operating
time was not being utilised. One reason was a relative
shortage of anaesthetists and anaesthetic nurses.
Anaesthetists were spending 85 per cent of their time
with patients, but surgeons only 25 per cent in surgery.
Another was slow changeover procedures between
operations. In one operating theatre, nearly a fifth of
operations were cancelled. Less than a third of these
were because the patient did not show up; the others
were due to inadequate organisation. Hitherto there
had been no distinction of routine from non routine
surgery (Kaplinsky, 1995).
An analysis of 1,000 operations at Karolinska
showed that more than two thirds of operations took
less than an hour. Further analysis made it possible to
identify that flexible capacity use of operating thea-
tres should not be in terms of the medical specialisa-
tion, but on the likely duration of the operation rather
than the type of operation. As a result all theatres
were segmented in four groups – “fast”, “medium”
“slow” and emergency. Flexible theatre use was
matched by flexible use of wards. Underlying this
was the principle of clustering “families of service”
both within the organisational logic of the hospital
and the operational logic of departments (Kaplinsky,
1995). In addition:
1. A new post of “nursing coordinator” was created
and adopted by most departments, whose respon-
sibilities included minimising the number of visits
a patient must make for appointments and sched-
uling pre operative preparation and post operative
care by doctors.
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2. Two operating theatres were closed but a new
pre-operation anaesthetic clinic opened.
3. More anaesthetists were hired, allowing senior
staff to focus on surgery and junior staff to man-
age all pre-operative patients.
The new position of “nursing coordinator” created a
career path for nurses, who in practice became re-
sponsible for the administration of the various de-
partments. Not all the doctors at Karolinska were
comfortable reporting to nurses, even on purely ad-
ministrative matters. But the new structure freed doc-
tors from administration to be able to spend more
time on their clinical work and research.
The results were impressive. The health service of-
fered by Karolinska had become “lean” (Womack et
al., 1990) by cutting wasted time and under-utilisa-
tion of staff and fixed resources. The time between
operations was cut by up to half. Average waiting
time for surgery was reduced from six to eight
months to six to three weeks. Overall unit costs were
cut by 15%. As an outcome, patient throughput also
increased 25%. Since the hospital was paid on the
basis of the number of patients treated, revenues in-
creased. Unlike “downsizing”, no one was made re-
dundant (Fortune, 1995).
4.2. An alternative paradigm
The Karolinska case has claims to paradigm status in
terms of a new model of hospital organisation. The
transition to a post Fordist model was conscious,
since Lindsten was aware of it in production. Yet it
also was externally driven by consultants. Many of
the medical staff felt that they knew what the prob-
lems were before the reorganisation exercise was
undertaken, and that it should have been “driven in-
ternally”. The implementation process also was more
once off and “big leap” rather than ongoing, with less
concern than within leading Japanese firms to ensure
mechanisms for voice in proposing many ongoing
“small steps” of “continuous improvement”
(Kaplinsky, 1995).
As within the production sphere, this suggests that if
a paradigm shift in health organisation is to be long
term, consent for it should be integral, based on
mutual dialogue between health managers, patients
and staff, rather than simply led top-down. It implies
that a hospital, or health clinic, or general practice,
should be able to gain key features of what has be-
come known as a “learning organisation”. It should
enable people to develop the skills they have gained
in their learning-from-work and recognise the value
of the stock and flow of those skills. Internal proce-
dures for “voice” will be needed for feedback on new
problems emerging from reorganisation, by drawing
on and recognising tacit knowledge and experience.
Especially, if “lean” health services are not to be
“mean” for employees (Wilkinson et al., 2001) their
rights need to be enhanced in a manner which can
ensure that change is to the mutual advantage of
patients, the hospital or health organisation, and
themselves.
4.3. Premises for consensual change
In the context of “continuous improvement” any
member of a learning organisation should be able to
lead, or propose a change to which, through dia-
logue, others could consent. In the “ideal type” case,
it should be possible for ongoing improvement to be
self-directed (Riesman, 1954) rather than only other-
directed. Such self-directed operational learning is
directly consistent with the mainstream tradition of
the Tavistock Human Relations School, and espe-
cially the thinking on management and leadership of
Barnard (1938). Barnard’s philosophy was that the
prime role of management should be to promote the
consent and commitment of its workforce to common
work values and operational culture by involving
them in what is done, why and by whom (Barnard,
ibid.). Or, as Walton (1985) puts it: “Workers re-
spond best — and most creatively — not when they
are tightly controlled by management... but, instead,
when they are given broader responsibilities, encour-
aged to contribute, and helped to take satisfaction in
their work” (Walton, 1985, p. 77). But this means a
shift from Taylorist top down “scientific manage-
ment” according to a single design to fostering a
multitude of designs by individual employees or
groups of employees.
Notably Frank Heller (2003), himself of the
Tavistock Institute, stresses that while motivation and
commitment may are vital, the evidence suggests that
they do not of themselves lead to changes or continu-
ous improvement in operational efficiency. Any hos-
pital manager will be well familiar with this. The
motivation and commitment of the staff may be out-
standing, but the organisation may suffer inertial
logic at this attained level of commitment. It may be
near, on or advancing a technical innovation frontier.
But in organisational terms it has reached an effi-
ciency “plateau” and neither is learning nor improv-
ing. It therefore is not achieving the “continuous
improvement” potential evident in the production
sphere from successful “kaizen” (Colenso, 2000).
Time and motion studies for efficiency of the kind
recommended by Taylor (1911) measure actual per-
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formance, not the potential to gain continuous im-
provement under changed conditions which can rec-
ognise both the needs of patients and also the needs
of the health workers. Kaizen type suggestions for
continual incremental improvements are not com-
patible with the top-down internal and external
logic of the NHS health and hospital reforms. Nor
are they feasible if there is no scope for internal
“voice” (Hirschman, 1970), since such voice im-
plies dissent from how things currently are being
done. Major change in organisational design will
tend to encounter explicit or implicit dissent
(Pascale, 1990), some of which may be defensive,
but for reasons grounded in learning from front line
work experience of a kind unknown to top manage-
ment or government and much of which, in terms of
tacit learning-from-work may be creative. The rel-
evance to organisational change is significant.
While managers seeking change and finding oppo-
sition to it tend to react instinctively, in terms of
considering such resistance “illogical”, they may in
fact be encountering something more significant
and deeper rooted — the fact that the new organi-
sational design may be inconsistent with the “im-
plicit logic” of their own employees” operational
work experience.
6. Changing operational
and organisational logic
The logic or rationality of what individuals or or-
ganisations do or wish to do, may therefore be ex-
plicit or implicit (Oliveira, 2000, 2001). Bolton
draws attention to the degree to which, at the heart
of two decades of attempting reform in the National
Health Service, there is “a logic that emphasizes
contradictory elements: the hospital must cut costs
but also deliver a quality service”. She adds that:
“As nurses account for the largest part of the hospi-
tal budget, and also are accountable for how the
quality of bedside care is perceived, these contra-
dictions deeply affect their work”(Bolton, 2004,
p. 320)
6.1. Organisational logic
Organisational logic amounts to what makes an or-
ganisation function well, less well or dysfunction. It
has various forms, some explicit which can be writ-
ten down such as its “mission statement”; or codi-
fied, as in specific contracts, or procedures in an
actual “management code” or “code of financial
practice” or “codes of procedure”. But the logic of
most organisations also is implicit in the manage-
ment style of the organisation – how it actually be-
haves, and what is expected of it by its clients, and
its employees. And, without reconciliation of a new
organisational logic with employees” own opera-
tional logic, proposed organisational change may
fail.
In this context there is a difference between what
Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996) call “espoused”
theory, or what people think they do or should so,
and “theory-in-use”, or what they actually do. Not
least, there may be an implicit rationality in Argyris
and Schön’s (1974, 1996) “theory-in-use”. In con-
trast with formal codes of practice, “tacit rules” and
“implicit norms” may underlie and tend to govern
both management style and organisational behaviour
(Oliveira, 2002). The rationale of explicitly espoused
theory may be widely ignored throughout the organi-
sation: “you can forget that” or “ignore that” on the
ward or even in the operating theatre is common.
This is not necessarily derogatory or a lowering of
standards. Someone’s Taylorist code of practice de-
signed yesterday may be irrelevant to best practice
today. Yet such learning in the sense of not doing
something which already is redundant because the
explicit logic of a code of practice has been out-
stripped by better actual practice remains implicitly
negative. It is “not going by the book” rather than re-
writing the book. Also, it does not of itself imply that
an organisation rather than a work group can learn
(Oliveira, 2004b).
6.2. Rethinking operational logic
6.2. and job re-design
The involvement of employees in change, and en-
couraging them to give “voice” (Hirschman, 1970)
therefore is vital, whether the context is radical,
such as transition from a Fordist to a post Fordist
organisational structure, or evolutionary in the
sense of achieving continuous improvement and
operational learning. What emerges is that the es-
sence of a learning organisation is not only a style
of leadership which encourages and recognises such
learning, but proactive participation in proposals at
and from operational level, or changes in opera-
tional logic from which the organisation can learn.
This does not mean that change can be achieved
without an initial concept or design for it. Someone
has to start the process, whether in management or
part of management, as in an operational unit, or
employees, through a trade association of trades
union. The implications of operational change for
change in organisational logic also need to be
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thought through, discussed, and able to modify an
initial proposal for change. However:
• Proposals for change in organisational logic are
less likely to succeed if they are only top down
and if they make no allowance for “creative dis-
sent” (Pascale, 1990) which can feed back from
the operational level into an initial design concept
and may modify it in either a primary or second-
ary manner.
• Proposals for change in operational logic are
more likely to succeed if they can be made by
employees at all levels. To be effective these
should be “middle-up” (middle management or
staff) and “base-up” (any employee or group of
employees) rather than only “top-down”. The or-
ganisation therefore becomes more self-directed
(Riesman, 1954) in its learning from the tacit
knowledge, latent abilities and implicit skills of
its workforce than “other-directed” by only top-
down design for change.
6.3. Psychological contracts
Much of the above is consistent with increased atten-
tion in human resource management to the concept
of “psychological contract” (Guest, 2003, 2004;
Conway & Briner, 2005). This includes key issues
concerning mutual trust, shared values and rewards,
competence recognition and skill enhancement, and
the degree to which these may improve not only
performance but individual job satisfaction. As Guest
(2003, 2004) puts the case, such a contract concerns
the perceptions of both parties to the employment
relationship, and of the reciprocal promises and ob-
ligations implied in that relationship. The state of the
psychological contract is concerned with whether
undertakings and obligations have been met, whether
they are fair, and their implications for trust. Percep-
tion of it may not be explicit. It tends to be implicit
in work attitudes and whether the organisation is
committed to employee as well as customer or client
welfare.
Implicit psychological contract therefore is two way.
For employers, it may offer implicit sanctions for not
respecting operational and organisational priorities.
Inversely, employees may frustrate such priorities if
they appear to them to breach an implicit contract.
Especially, as evident in reaction from nurses in
Bolton’s (2004) case study, Taylorist performance
appraisal may reduce trust by indicating that employ-
ers are more concerned with operational performance
criteria than with individual employee skills, rights or
wellbeing or their own devolved decisions on the
best means of delivering quality in service to patients
at operational level.
One of the main implications of Guest’s analysis is
that while psychological contract is tacit, it needs
explicating — or bringing into the open — to be
effective. Notable among these are deliberate design
of jobs to make full use of skills and abilities; devo-
lution to units and services for decisions on how to
best organise their own work operation within given
criteria for quality of service; staff informed about
overall performance and prospects; consultation on
any changes in methods of work organisation; har-
monised terms and conditions of work; explicit com-
mitment to employment security, and a formal sys-
tem of communicating current problems and
potential solutions to higher levels of management.
7. Gaining a paradigm shift
In effect, to transcend conflict in transition to new
paradigms in health and hospital organisation, dia-
logue within management and with other employees
should not be on how they should conform to
change, especially in terms of the operational logic of
what is done, how and by whom, but how they can
contribute to it. It is in this sense that any initial
design for change should be provisional. It also must
be clear that the change as realised as an outcome
thereby can be to mutual advantage for employees,
the hospital and patients. Hospital staff are likely be
aware of how this could be done, but never expressed
it because the procedures enabling them to do so
were missing. No one asked them how what they or
their group did could be improved; what in their view
would be needed to gain change, or how they thought
such change would need to be approached to gain
consent. Reversing this was very much the outcome
of the “big leap” to post Fordist organisation at
Karolinska, where medical staff had not previously
been given the chance to voice or comment on pro-
posals for change (Kaplinsky, 1995).
7.1. Mutual advantage
A health paradigm focussed on mutual advantage for
patients, management and employees, unlike the
British National Health Service reforms, offers at
least three key gains, none of which concern “instru-
mental motivation” such as pay although none ex-
clude it. The first is the right to negotiate the inci-
dence of work time and personal time, or better
work-life balance. The second is recognition of tacit
knowledge, latent abilities and implicit skills, and the
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right to formal skills extension in the context of
Skills Path Planning. The third is the recognition of
implicit skills and experience and explicit skills ex-
tension in the form of job redesign and re-designa-
tion.
Most management is prepared within certain explicit
or implicit norms to negotiate the incidence of work
time and personal time. X has worked so many hours
last week and therefore is entitled to an additional
half day off this week. Y has worked so many nights
last month and therefore need not do so next week or
next month. But time planning rather than time-off is
rare. Rather than X or Y simply being entitled to time
in lieu this could include the right of the individual to
negotiate the specific incidence of working time in
relation to his or her needs and aspirations: i.e. flex-
ible work organisation which enables staff to “per-
sonalise” their working time in a manner which an
organisation should in turn be able to integrate into
its own forward personnel planning.
7.2. Time credits and work-life balance
Credit in the financial sphere is what keeps banks in
business. Lifetime financial planning is what insur-
ance and pensions are about. Time credits for em-
ployees in relation to gaining a better balance be-
tween work time and life time are overdue. They
would mean the right to credit for overtime which in
turn can be drawn on as later “undertime” in a man-
ner which fits personal or family needs and improves
work-life balance. This could include both annual
and multi-annual planning time credits. Health work-
ers could be invited to submit their own “forward
plans” for overtime and undertime, such as “this year
I need X weeks to study this or that short course” or
“my mother has cancer and has only six to eight
months before she goes. I cannot do any overtime in
this period, or for however long she is with us”.
Time credits and work-life balance also could extend
to life time planning. Such as a young health worker
without family responsibilities being ready to work
extensive overtime for several years in return for a
paid sabbatical year to “see the world”, or study. Or
a middle aged employee being prepared to see over-
time pay invested in an increased pension, or in-
creased early retirement bonus. The time credit prin-
ciple does not mean all overtime being paid, on the
one hand, or credited on the other. Individual staff
may opt for a combination of both. Also, since health
workers have been accustomed to paid overtime to
maintain their standard of living, time credits would
need to able to take account of total personal income
streams over time. But this feeds back to efficiency
gains from new methods of work operation. Inas-
much as these should make it possible to deliver ei-
ther the same or a better service to patients in less
time, employees should be able to gain the same
overall pay and rate of pay increase to which they
would be entitled with current overtime.
Time planning does not necessarily mean lifetime
commitment, nor need it imply a formal right to this.
But many large organisations such as hospitals either
expect or aim to retain staff long term to avoid losing
their skills and experience, while absenteeism be-
cause of unrelieved work stress is common to hospi-
tals. Time planning therefore should suit rather than
frustrate hospital organisation to the degree to which
it reduces absenteeism or loss of skills with undue
levels of early retirement, or nursing staff who stop
working to have a family, or for other family reasons,
and not returning.
7.3. Skills recognition
One of the principles for agreements on innovation
between management and employees which was rec-
ommended by the June 2000 Lisbon Council was
skill extension and lifelong learning (Oliveira &
Holland, 2007). This needs organisational context.
Not everyone can be promoted. But any implicit skill
can be (1) recognised; (2), in principle, extended.
Skills recognition happens in a hospital every day.
Surgeon X asks for operating theatre assistant Y for
what clearly is going to be a difficult operation. The
recognition is tacit and implicit in the sense that X
may say no more than “I’ll need him/her for this
one” or “Make sure Y can be on the shift”. But it
could be explicit. In the Karolinska case, the new
position of “nursing coordinator” created a career
path for nurses, who in practice became the adminis-
trative heads of various departments.
Such a career path for senior and experienced oper-
ating theatre nursing staff could include routine sur-
gery. Rather than out-sourcing this as in the case of
routine eye surgery in the NHS “diagnosis and treat-
ment centres”, it could be delegated within the hos-
pital. A senior nurse or operating theatre assistant
may have 7, 10 or more years’ experience of a par-
ticular operation such as appendectomy. Such nurses
not only can assist experienced surgeons but also by
example indicate to those who are less experienced
what might be “better” practice or, in some cases,
simply what not to do. The offering of an alternative
surgical instrument, with a gesture implying that it
might be more appropriate; drawing attention to
raised blood pressure, or heart rate which the junior
doctor has not noticed because of preoccupation with
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getting the surgical task done properly, and so on. In
effect, an experienced senior surgical nurse may be
better qualified informally for an operation than a
novice surgeon despite his or her skills not being
formally credited (Oliveira, 2004a). After appropriate
assessment and accreditation by senior medical staff
in the hospital, on criteria reflecting its own best
practice, such senior surgical nurses could introduce
junior doctors to basic surgical techniques rather than
consultants needing to do so.
There is extensive corroboration of this in a study of
16 operating teams in different US hospitals by Amy
Edmonson of Harvard Business School (Edmonson,
2003) with especial interest in that what she studied
was how units in cardiac units reacted to, and then
acted on, the feasibility of then new non-invasive
techniques for heart transplants. She found a marked
difference in the effectiveness of doing this between
those teams which were led top-down by a lead sur-
geon who implicitly assumed to appropriate and
claim leadership concerning the new specialised
knowledge, and others who shared with the rest of
the unit the degree to which gaining skill and expe-
rience in the techniques would be difficult and de-
pend on a high degree of mutual cooperation and
“speaking up”. Evidencing the above claims that a
senior nurse might indicate to or suggest to a junior
surgeon that “x” or “y” might be needed or better,
she cites how in “mutual learning teams” a staff
nurse could and did suggest to a consultant “maybe
you should try this”, and of anaesthetists having the
right to “speak out” and stop surgeons until they had
secured the stability of the patient. Unsurprisingly,
mutual learning teams had a faster and steeper learn-
ing curve, and a higher success rate (Edmonson,
ibid).
7.4. Skills extension
Formally recognising the surgical skills of nominally
unqualified nurses would nominally challenge hierar-
chy, overt rules and explicit norms. Yet, as with the
new post of “nursing coordinators” at Karolinksa, it
also could liberate surgeons from many routine op-
erations, enable them to use their own cumulative
skills on more complex cases, and give more time for
research, or their own personal time. Recognising
senior nurses’ surgical skills would need would need
both evaluation and assessment by agreed proce-
dures, and also patient consent. But if skilled nurses
were able to perform routine operations, undue,
stressful and painful waiting time for patients could
be reduced. Hierarchy could be maintained, in a
more flexible context, to the degree that a consultant
or senior doctor would need to decide what is or is
not a routine operation. Some of them also could be
“on call” in the vicinity in the event of the surgery
proving more complex, or the patient’s condition
hazardous not least if they were researching or train-
ing rather than also engaged in routine surgery.
Prime facie, there is a strong case for explicitly ex-
tending the skills and experience of such nursing and
other technical staff in job redesign and re-designa-
tion. The job redesign could be recognised in job re-
designation: “Nursing Surgeon” or “Assistant Sur-
geon” rather than only “Surgical Assistant” or
“Senior Nurse”. The screening and approval proce-
dure would be internal in order to gain consent
within the unit concerned, and involve “customised
training” and evaluation of the skills of the senior
nurses involved. Consent from patients would be
vital, but would tend to be gained to the degree that
competence became evident. Trading off the pre-
sumption of needing a “surgeon” rather than a “nurs-
ing surgeon” against a waiting time of weeks rather
than months, or over a year, for routine surgery could
have its own supply and demand outcome.
Nor should it be presumed that reaction from profes-
sional associations representing doctors and consult-
ants would be uniformly negative. As Bolton (2004)
has stressed, within their own “professionalisation”
project, UK nurses are taking on tasks normally as-
sociated with the role of junior doctors, albeit with-
out an increase in either pay or status, and therefore
considerable resentment concerning this. Higher pay,
rather than skill recognition by job redesign and
redesignation, nonetheless, need not be the only
motivator, as we have found in case studies in other
services. The potential of this for increasing internal
efficiency and service to patients without loss of
quality of service is considerable. It not only could
reduce waiting lists, but do so without having to
speed up the turnover time of ward and bed use and
externalise the internally unaccounted costs of con-
tinued care to family members, general practitioners
or health visitors, with the related gain of also reduc-
ing readmissions.
7.5. Five conditions for consensual change
On such grounds, it therefore is arguable that gaining
both an organisational and operational change based
on consent rather than constraint needs:
1) Organisational Re-Design. Someone should have
a clear concept of a change in organisational de-
sign, whether in a department, unit or service of
the hospital or for the hospital as a whole (as with
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the general manager of Karolinska), or a Head of
HRM, or a professional association, such as that
for nursing in the UK, or a trades union.
2) Operational Re-Design. Employees at all levels
should be able to propose changes in procedures
and methods of work operation, and modifica-
tions to the initial organisational re-design. This is
vital if explicit design changes are not to be frus-
trated by failure to involve employees, and tacit
resistance to them (Argyris and Schön, 1974,
1996).
3) Feedback and Voice. Effective feedback and
voice — both ways — is vital for management
and employees on the varying options and their
implications (Hirschman, 1970). Such voice
should be able to articulate and improve what
otherwise is implicitly assumed in “psychological
contract”. And it should be ongoing rather than
once-off.
4) Integration of Operational and Organisational
Logic. The implications of employee proposals
for operational change should relate to and be
able to modify the proposed change in organisa-
tional design and in this sense integrate changes
in both operational and organisational logic. This
also should be done in an incremental, iterative
step-by-step manner rather than a “take it or leave
it” basis.
5) Mutual Advantage. All employees should be able
to see potential mutual gains from the proposals
for new organisational design because, at opera-
tional level, they themselves have proposed many
of them. This need not take the form of written or
legal contracts, but could be recorded on a mutu-
ally agreed basis which itself can be a benchmark
for later assessment of the degree to which such
mutual gains have or have not been sustained.
This also could include the general principle
through the right to customise working time by
time credits balancing overtime with “undertime”
as part of a mutual advantage strategy for better
work-life balance.
8. The cultural factor
One of the key questions relevant to the proposals
made in this article is whether Scandinavian or Japa-
nese models can be translated to other institutional,
organisational or national cultures. South Korean
firms have been especially successful in adopting and
adapting of the main principles of the Toyota produc-
tion system. By contrast, some US companies since
the 1980’s have tried to adopt flexible or lean pro-
duction as an operational logic, but have not been
able to translate the concept of kaizen style continu-
ous improvement to organisational thinking and
practice. Their consequent loss of market share both
globally and within the States to Japanese and South
Korean firms has been pronounced. Also, rather than
seeking to address the need for organisational logic
on continuous improvement principles, General Mo-
tors hived its internal components division, which
now has filed for bankruptcy, while there is wide-
spread speculation that one or more of the “big three”
also may need to file (Simon, 2005, 2006; Simon &
Mackintosh, 2006; Beales, Simon, & Mackintosh,
2006).
The Karolinska case indicates that a transfer of the
flexible production and organisation paradigm from
Japan to Scandinavia can be effected with marked
success both across countries and from the auto sector
to hospital organisation. We also have found by direct
enquiry that the Volkswagen Autoeuropa auto assem-
bly plant in Portugal which, like the rest of the parent
group, has consciously adopted Japanese lean or flex-
ible production, kaizen style continuous improvement
and operational learning, has managed to do so with
remarkable success and a high degree of management
and employee consent and commitment. Overall, it
has achieved high levels of efficiency on a range of
group indicators and on this basis in 2006 was allo-
cated a further new model which would diversify its
range and increase its employment by three thousand
persons (Prado, 2006).
9. Concluding recommendations
Specific recommendations have already been made,
and the concluding recommendations therefore can
be quite brief. Working with the people you employ
is better than working against them when changes
can be to mutual advantage. Cutting staff to cut costs
without changing operational practice and organisa-
tional paradigms is a negative sum game which in-
creases pressure on remaining employees and may
further raise labour turnover without increasing the
quality or efficiency of patient care. Inversely, a
major increase in resources but within a Taylorist
paradigm of flexibility-by-constraint, as in the British
NHS reforms since the 1980’s, will not allow suffi-
cient voice for lower level employees either to ex-
press what is not going right, or is going wrong, or
should and could be improved. It also, as in the UK
case, may prove unsustainable financially. External-
ising costs either by out-sourcing, or the cost of post
operative care by more rapid turnover, may raise
patient throughput but also decrease the quality of
health care.
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By contrast, dialogue on new methods of work op-
eration can indicate better ways of using fixed costs
by more variable work practices. This is consistent
with the case for flexibility-by-consent on the basis
of mutual advantage which in turn is consistent with
the recommendation of innovation agreements be-
tween management and employees within the Lis-
bon Agenda (Oliveira & Holland, 2007). Where en-
largement of lower level employee skills, and a shift
of administering patient flow from doctors to nurs-
ing care coordinators could mean a net increase in
the time for doctors to pursue research or other
private practice in a sector under increasing de-
mand, the consequence for them could be a positive
outcome.
The underlying challenge is to change the paradigm
of hospital organisation in a manner which can in-
crease both patient throughput and the quality of
service in terms of reduced waiting time with re-
duced costs through different methods of work or-
ganisation. In turn, such different methods should be
able to focus on the needs of overstrained staff and
enhance both their work-life balance and profes-
sional self-fulfilment. Since the Portuguese Presi-
dency of the European Council in the spring of 2000,
many EU governments have recommended or intro-
duced legislation to enhance work-life balance
(Hildebrandt & Littig, 2006). Whether legislation
would be needed in Portugal to implement either this
or the principle of innovation-by-agreement is a
matter which the government itself could address if it
is concerned to demonstrate to the rest of the EU that
it is committed to the re-launch of the Lisbon Agenda
by the European Union in 2005.
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Resumo
MODELOS ALTERNATIVOS DE ORGANIZAÇÃO E
PRESTAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS DE SAÚDE
Na grande maioria dos países europeus, os serviços hospitala-
res e de saúde têm vindo a ser pressionados a reduzir custos e
aumentar eficiência. Este artigo analisa o modo como as orga-
nizações de cuidados de saúde têm vindo a adoptar uma das
duas vias: «mercados internos» no pressuposto implícito de
uma maior margem de escolha quer para quem presta o serviço
quer para quem o utiliza, ou «flexibilidade interna» e benefí-
cios na eficiência na base da vantagem mútua para ambos os
utilizadores e prestadores de serviços de saúde. Estes paradig-
mas são analisados por referência aos que reflectem o que se
passa no sector da produção, em particular os modelos
«Fordistas» para redução de custos na base do volume dos
serviços prestados, e os modelos «pós-fordistas» para a flexi-
bilização das práticas de trabalho com ênfase numa prestação
de serviços com qualidade e personalizada. Evidências de estu-
dos de caso na área da saúde no Reino Unido sugerem que
«mercados internos» e o fordismo contribuem para o aumentou
do número de pacientes atendidos sem no entanto reduzir
custos ou alargar a margem de escolha dos pacientes, tendo
mesmo em alguns casos consequências na diminuição da qua-
lidade do serviço prestado. As implicações destes paradigmas
alternativos de flexibilidade-por-constrangimento e flexibili-
dade-por-consentimento são relacionadas com a proposta de
acordos-de-inovação, aprendizagem ao longo da vida e melhor
equilíbrio vida-trabalho tal como recomendado no Conselho
Europeu de Lisboa em Junho de 2000. Partindo do princípio de
que existem diferenças culturais, é argumentado que é possível
em Portugal a transição para um modelo flexível pós-fordista
com ganhos de eficiência nos serviços prestados na saúde na
base de uma vantagem mútua quer para pacientes quer presta-
dores de serviços. Uma nota especial de atenção é dada ao
facto de tal modelo de melhoria contínua ter sido bem sucedido
no sector da produção em Portugal.
Palavras-chave: fordismo; pós-fordismo; taylorismo; lógica
organizacional e operacional; acordos-de-inovação; vantagem
mútua.
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